Dakotadad x-95

Cheeloo Hospital 3.che.00020 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/04/03/cheeloo-hospital-3-che-00020-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5886316/ Fri, 03 Apr 2009 23:22:23 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>[A-18] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 31 August 13, 1941 #690. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo (English text) (In 5 parts—complete) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Recent cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas of China. Information received by the Department of State from American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China indicate that the Japanese authorities and Japanese-sponsored authorities have recently undertaken widespread and expanding activities of arbitrary nature against American official establishments. American officials, and American rights and interests. In North China the travel of Americans, including American consular officers, is being stopped, severely restricted, or delayed by a system of travel permits set up by the Japanese military authorities and by refusal of permits or delay in their issuance. At Chingwangtao, Americans embarking for Shanghai are required not only to have a permit for rail travel to Chinwangtao but also a landing permit from the Japanese naval authorities which requires at least one week to obtain. (It is assumed that similar requirements are in force at Tientsin and Tsingtao.) At Peitaiho, where a large number of Americans and other foreigners pass the summer, transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station is forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. Travel of American citizens in Japan has been restricted so that Americans desiring to proceed to Shanghai to obtain available accommodations for travel to the United States have been unable to proceed. At Tsingtao the mail of American citizens, including the official mail of the American Consulate, is apparently being held up and censored, American firms are being prohibited from moving their stocks and carrying on business and are not permitted to draw funds from Japanese banks to pay their staff salaries. The premises of the Standard-Vacuum and Texas Oil Companies and of the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company have been occupied by Japanese gendarmes. Protests against the smoking of cigarettes by Japanese sentires in the oil installations of American companies have been without avail. Garages have been forbidden to furnish taxicabs to American citizens, including the American Consul, or to do automotive repair work for American citizens. It is reported on good authority that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese authorities on Americans there include, in addition to some of those listed above, a prohibition of coal deliveries to American citizens and the withholding of American Red Cross famine relief wheat from distribution to refugees by the International Relief Association. Chinese have been intimidated and instructed not to sell food products to or engage in other transactions with Americans if the products exceed in value, or the transactions involve more than, twenty local dollars, and orders have been issued for the cancellation of American insurance policies. At Chefoo mail addressed to Americans is being held up and registered mail received by the American Consulate has shown evidence of having been opened by censors. The stocks of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the Texas Company have been placed under the control of the Japanese special military mission; sales may only be made by permit and the proceeds must be handed over to the Japanese; and American firms cannot withdraw funds from the Yokohama Specie Bank to meet their pay rolls. At Hwanghsien, Shantung, the Baptist Mission is being picketed, no American is allowed to move his personal effects, the American members of the mission are restricted to the immediate vicinity of the compound and are prohibited from using their automobiles, as well as being prevented from traveling to Chefoo. [A-19] At Tientsin, American firms are unable to make rail shipments and the post office in one instance refused to accept a registered letter addressed by an American firm to the United States. At Foochow, two policemen visited the Consulate stating that they had been instructed by the Japanese authorities to see that "nothing passed in or out" and asking to be given quarters in the Consulate. (The policemen departed upon being asked to do so by the Consul.) Similar activities were undertaken by the police with more success against American firms and missionary institutions. At Hsinan, a virtual blockade of Cheeloo University (Anglo-America) the Cheeloo Hospital (American) has been established, no foodstuffs or other articles being allowed to enter those two missionary institutions. At Kobe, the telephone service of the Standard Oil Company was cut off because the Company was unable to draw funds to pay the telephone bill. At Swatow, unwarranted interference by the Japanese with American firms engaged in the linen drawn work trade has occurred and shipments have been obstructed. In Japan, by the restrictions on the use of the English language over the telephone, American diplomatic and consular offices are denied a facility which is essential to the proper functioning of these offices. At Mukden, control over the movements and activities of Americans has been rigid. American Catholic mission sisters at Fushun were permitted by police to visit the Consulate for passport service only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Long distance telephone calls have been restricted to the Japanese or Chinese languages and when the consulate at Mukden attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, it was informed that it "had better cancel the call". At Dairen, consular officials are under police surveillance and are followed in all their movements, persons entering and leaving the Consulate are stopped by police and questioned, the Consulate's messengers are stopped by police and the mail and telegrams in their care taken for scrutiny, and in general the conduct of the Dairen authorities toward, and their interference with the legitimates of, the American Consulates seem to show a desire by those authorities to make the position of the Consul untenable. Trans. 8-18-41 No. 32 August 13, 1941 #689. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo Re my message #684[a]. At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, I had an interview with the Secretary of State. He handed me a note, the text of which is contained in my separate message #690[b], which listed recent instances of interferences and damages to U.S. rights and interests in Japan and in areas taken over by Japan. The Secretary said that these had no connection with the "freezing" order but, in the main, concerned only individuals. He added that he had no intention of releasing the contents of the note for press publication, etc. which would unduly aggravate general public opinion. The Secretary pointed out that whereas there were only a few hundred U.S. citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd thousand of Japanese in the United States. I, therefore, replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the "freezing" order enacted by the United States. Moreover, it is true that measures against individuals are being taken there to parallel those here. Such pin prickings, however, do not particularly affect the general situation but they are annoyances. I expressed my hopes that such practices would be mutually discontinued. [A-20]Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR The Secretary took this opportunity to bring up the subject of the bombing of Chungking, so I explained that we had promised not to bomb any of the suburban areas for a time. In parting, Hull inquired whether I planned to be in Washington during the latter part of this week. I replied that I did. The way he said it, gave me the impression that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement. [a] See III, 30. [b] See III, 31. Trans. 8-18-41 No. 33 August 15, 1941 #480. FROM: Tokyo TO: Washington Regarding my #452[a]. There seem to be those persons who interpret the misfortune which befell Vice Premier Hiranuma as extremist's reaction to any cooperation with Britain and the United States. This is a completely erroneous conclusion. Public opinion in Japan will approve any fair revision of national relations, regardless of who the other party may be. In spite of the recent unfortunate incident, the government's attitude is unshaken. Therefore, although we are aware of the matter contained in your message #674[b], will you please relay the matter contained in my message #470[c] to the President immediately, in an attempt to have this proposal accepted. Our aim is the settlement of broad issues and the prevention of a general calamity. We intend to convey our proposal to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo at the first opportune moment. [a] See III, 12—Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that my be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific. [b] See III, 23—Amb. Nomura expresses the belief that the proposed meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye will have little success in swerving the firm attitude of the U.S. in its Far Eastern policy. [c] See III, 25—Our proposals in reply to President's suggestions were not intended to imply a final answer on our part. Please see that there is no misunderstanding on this point. Trans. 8-19-41 No. 34 August 16, 1941 #705. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo (In 4 parts—complete.) I received intelligences to the following effect regarding the meeting of leaders of Britain and the United States: Britain's aims at this conference were to draw the United States into the war, and to utilize her to take care of the critical situation in the Far East. The United States aimed at forcing Britain to clarify her war aims and thus to check British ambitions. The joint statement which was announced subsequent to the conference was clear proof that the United States gained her aims with Britain having to assume a disadvantageous position. Upon receiving the above report, I deemed it essential that we make some preliminary overtures to the government of the United States prior to the return of the President to Washington. [A-21] I, therefore, called on the Secretary of State this afternoon and relayed to him your instructions to me, and added that it was of vital importance that the relations between the two countries be revised. To this, the Secretary repeated his stock replies and added, in effect: "You and I are striving to come to a peaceful settlement. In the meantime, however, we have been forced to witness military domination." I pointed out that if matters were permitted to proceed unchecked along the present course, the outcome was only too clear. "A Pacific war", I continued, in effect, "will not be as simple an undertaking as is apparently imagined by the high officials. It will be mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world. Do not be mislead into thinking that such a war would be terminated speedily simply because the United States is rich and Japan is poor. It will probably develop into a war of exhaustion, lasting several years. And in the final analysis, neither will have anything to gain by it. "The politics of our countries should not be swayed by the hot heads which exist in both. Our two countries must, moreover, keep constantly on guard against the enticing counters made by third countries." The Secretary gave indications of agreeing with this. He agreed that third countries were engaged in considerable activities in Japan and also in the United States. "There are even those", he said, "who claim that Hitler launched the war knowing far in advance what Stalin's attitude was". I strongly denied the charges of military domination, pointing out that Japan has an Imperial family whose line has been unbroken for 2600 years. The characteristics of Japan and the Japanese differed from those countries which could change themselves overnight through a simple revolution. Although we do talk of the Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, this does not mean military conquests, but merely means living together by defending together. It does not differ much from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, I said. The Secretary pondered over this statement for a while. Then he said, "The United States merely recognizes the equal status of all of the countries involved without resorting to the force of arms". "The stronger the pressure is on her from the outside," I said, "the stronger Japan will retaliate. On the other hand, if the pressure is taken off of her, Japan will resort to her common senses and will find a peaceful way out". The Secretary showed an inclination to agree with this. With regard to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, I said that as a purely personal opinion of a simple individual, it seemed to me that it should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Many of the points contained in the Eight Point Joint Agreement coincide directly with the Konoye Statement made public some time ago, I said. In view of this fact it seemed logical that two of the authors might be able to find a way, through those instruments, to revise the relations between the two countries. The only reason that Japan is willing to send her leaders to such a conference is because she sincerely wants the meeting to be a successful one, I pointed out. "In spite of this," I asked, "does the United States still deem that it is an impossibility?" The Secretary replied that although he had been unable to take the matter up with anyone outside the office as yet, he would take it up with the White House at the earliest opportunity if I sincerely desired it. This was a different attitude from that which he had expressed earlier. (This may have been due to his talking with a Cabinet colleague about which I reported in an earlier message.) [A-22] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR He then asked me what I thought of the general outlook in the United States today. So I replied that it would be exceedingly dangerous under present conditions in the United States, if we were to leave matters as they are. I have already been advised of the situation with regard to our southward moves. Recently, much alarming news has been distributed in this area with regard to the Siberian area. I would like to be advised, for my information only, what the true state of affairs there is. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Trans. 8-20-41 No. 35 August 16, 1941 #703. FROM: Washington TO: Tokyo (Part 1 of 4) Re your #480. (1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a state in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire. Trans. 8-19-41</p> 5886316 2009-04-03 23:22:23 2009-04-03 23:22:23 open open cheeloo-hospital-3-che-00020-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5886316 publish 0 0 post 0 cheeloo DARLAN handed Ambassador KATO 2.dar.111 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/04/03/darlan-handed-ambassador-kato-2-dar-111-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5881088/ Fri, 03 Apr 2009 03:27:35 +0200 Beforethebigbang <p>No. 851 FROM: Tokyo July 21, 1941 TO: Vichy # 298. Re your # 393 [a]. (1) We are prepared to give assurances regarding the respecting of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of French Indo‑China. As to the form in which it should appear, in their reply of acceptance, this was demanded by the French, but when the formal documents are drafted, we would like to have the title of the protocol dealing with joint defense changed to read "regarding the territorial integrity and joint defense of French Indo‑China". Then, changing Article I and II to II and III respectively, add as Article I a statement that "The Japanese government declares that it will respect the territorial integrity of French Indo‑China and the sovereignty of France over the Indo‑China Federation." (2) In regard to making it clear that the French Indo‑China army cannot cooperate in any plans for aggression against a third power, we have no objection to the French stating this in their reply of acceptance, but if the French demand that this be clearly stated in the formal document, you will point out that the intent of this is made clear in the preamble and in Article I of our original draft of the protocol, and try to suppress such a demand. If the French insist upon it, we would rather have a secret exchange of notes in regard to Article I of the protocol, or a statement by the French only, to the effect that "the military cooperation between Japan and France, anticipated by Article I of the protocol on the joint defense of French Indo‑China is purely of a defensive nature and does not include any plans for aggression against a third power". Or as a last resort, we would suggest that the above import be added as a qualifying explanation to Article I of the protocol.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire (3) As to the period of duration of this agreement, you will please reply that while our proposed protocol does not specify any time limit, this does not mean that we intend to formulate everlasting promises, but it means that the way is left open for changing the protocol at any time by further mutual agreement between the two countries. In case they insist upon a time limit, you might approach them with a suggested wording to the effect that "when the international situation that has made necessary the joint defense of French Indo‑China shall have passed, the governments of the two countries shall confer for the abrogation of this protocol", but as a last stand we have in mind agreeing upon a five year time limit. [a] II, 847. Trans. 7‑24‑41 A-445 No. 852 FROM: Vichy July 21, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 396. (Parts 2 and 3 of 3, Part 1 missing.) Part 2. It is in this regard that the French government, faithful to the policy which it has always affirmed, and in cooperation with the Japanese government, will guarantee the defense of Indo‑Chinese against all attack, and particularly to exclusion all offensive operations and alleged defensive measures having this protection as their objective. After agreement of the French and Japanese commands ‑‑‑‑- (remainder of part 2 garbled out.) Part 3. On the other hand it must be thoroughly understood that the presence of Japanese forces in the territory or waters of the Union can only be temporary, and that the Imperial government will proceed to the complete withdrawal of its forces as soon as the removal of the dangers which led to their admission. The French government insists upon the extreme urgency of this indispensable declaration in the circumstances for the maintenance of order in Indo‑China and the effective carrying out of the measures made necessary by the arrival of the Japanese armed forces. Trans. 7‑23‑41 No. 853 FROM: Vichy July 21, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 395. (Part 1 of 2, Part 2 not available) Re my # 389 [a]. At his request, I called on Darlan during the morning of the 21st. He advised me that the government of France had decided to cooperate with Japan in defending French Indo‑China in accordance with Japanese demands. Thereupon, he read to me the French text which is being forwarded to you as my separate message # 396 [b]. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG He then went on to explain the reasons for the use of the phrase to the effect that France has no alternative than to be inclined (s'incliner) to accept the Japanese demands. There may be those, he pointed out, both within the country and without, who would protest against the paradox of French resistance to the British in Syria on the one hand and the welcoming of Japanese troops in French Indo‑China on the other. Actually, however, France is anxious to have Japanese cooperation in defending French Indo‑China. Please be advised, the Foreign Minister continued, that France is in no way opposed to the Japanese demands. The French attach considerable importance to our immediately publishing a statement along the lines of Premier Konoye's message to Marshal Petain regarding the respecting of the sovereignty of French Indo‑China, Darlan said. The statement to be published was put in the form of a supplement to the French reply to our demands a said, and proceeded to read it to me. The text of the statement is contained in my separate message # 397 [c]. He added that there was one more point on which France wanted to be assured. This was just that the Japanese forces do not order the removal of the French Indo‑Chinese forces now stationed in French Indo‑China from their posts; that demands are not made on the various fa‑ A-446 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR cilities now being used by the French forces; and that fighting and merchant vessels are not ordered from their present berths. [a] Not available. [b] See II, 852. [c] See II, 854. Trans. 7‑23‑4 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire No. 854 FROM: Vichy July 22, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 397. The French government attaches extreme importance to the published declaration relative to respect for the integrity of Indo‑China and for French sovereignty. Since foreign troops have arrived in territories which they considered it necessary to guard, in spite of this declaration, it was necessary to know exactly the number of such troops stationed in Indo‑China. Trans. 7‑23‑41 No. 855 FROM: Tokyo July 24, 1941 TO: Hanoi # 101. Message from Vichy # 409 on the 22nd. (Part 1 of 2) The reason why the French so readily accepted the Japanese proposals was that they saw how resolute was our determination and how swift was our action. In short, they had no alternative but to yield. Now lately France has been going through a bitter experience in Syria. Japan has guaranteed the territorial integrity of French Indo‑China. We decided to undertake the military occupation of French Indo‑China under the guise of a joint agreement with France. This however, does not mean at all that they heartily approve of our action. At this time when relations between Japan and France are so delicate and when the French feelings are, to say the least, hurt, our army must show the greatest leniency and understanding. If we take the attitude that, in view of whatever military operations we shall have to carry out in the future France must be forced to follow us to the end, the sentiments of the French people and officials may become so incensed that a permanent estrangement may result. Our Empire must take a long view of its destiny and not bring about any such situation as this. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG During the recent conversations, DARLAN strongly stated that if Vichy recognizes the occupation of French Indo‑China by the Japanese forces, Japan must positively not interfere in the administration of this territory. Again DARLAN asked what statement we were ready to make upon occupying French Indochina, saying that if we demanded the withdrawal of French troops or confiscated private A-447 property, the wrath of Frenchmen in southern French Indo‑China would be terrible, which in his opinion was something to give us pause. Trans. 7‑28‑41 No. 856 FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941 TO: Vichy # 299. (Very urgent.) Secret Re your # 392 [a]. If you find that DA's [b] formal reply does not differ from the statement made to you by BU, will you proceed immediately along the following lines and wire me the result at once: 1. I would like to have you tell them that we will comply with their wishes and at the same time Japan will quickly publish the statement in (2) and also that we will recognize (3), namely, the fact that the French Indo‑China Army will not participate in any plans of an offensive nature by putting this point, in accordance with the French desire, into a proper form. (Please refer to my # 298 [c].) 2. We will exchange the document mentioned in your # 391 [d], and at the same time recognize what is in my # 293 [d]. (If they question the necessary number of troops specified in my # 293 [d], you need not let them know of the fact that the number of troops is 40,000.) Relay to ‑‑‑‑‑. [a] II, 846. [b] DARLAN [c] II, 851. [d] Not available. Trans. 7‑24‑41 No. 857 FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941 TO: Vichy # 300. Strictly Secret. Re your # 394 [a]. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Inasmuch as the custom of using the Japanese language for the final text of a treaty is a well‑established fundamental rule and especially since the protocol in question is one of great importance, we cannot agree to having only the French language used. Of course, it would be all right for the sake of expediting the procedure to proceed with the negotiations on the basis of the French draft and then, after the draft has been put into final shape, to wire us the same. We will use it to make a Japanese version of the text and wire the latter to you. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire As you may see from the recently concluded peace treaty between France and Thailand and from the French Indo‑China economic treaty, the French Government did not express any concern http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG A-448 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR over these treaties being in the Japanese language. In fact, they left the entire matter to our discretion and so I hardly think they would have any objections to the suggestion given above. However, in accordance with what is customary in France, only the French language may be used in case of diplomatic notes. I am sending you this information for your reference. [a] II, 848. Trans. 7‑24‑41 No. 858 FROM: Tokyo July 22, 1941 TO: Hanoi # 197. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire (Strictly secret) Re my # 198 [a]. At noon on the 21st, DARLAN handed Ambassador KATO an official reply. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG It is essentially like what BUNOA NESIAN [a] told the Ambassador yesterday. There are only two discrepancies. The note says that France is forced to submit to Japan, and as soon as this occupation is no longer necessary, she expects the troops to be evacuated as soon as possible; and DARLAN verbally stated that he trusted that the French Indo‑China army and navy would not be dislocated from its present positions and duties. [a] Not available. [b] Kana spelling for BUNOIR‑NESSIEN. Trans. 7‑25‑41 No. 859 FROM: Vichy (Japanese Ambassador) July 24, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 426. Regarding your # 305 [a]. Upon making inquiries of the French Authorities, I understand that the Spokesman in connection with the French Indo‑China question and in reply to queries as to the truth of the report concerning the establishment of a compromise between Japan and France said, "The time is not yet ripe for making any kind of a statement." It was thought that in all probability newspaper editors, in writing their editorials, had waxed fanciful. Then again, I had Harada call on Vice‑Minister Roshier. The latter is understood to have said that insofar as France was concerned it was necessary to prepare public opinion to counter the vigorous propaganda of England and the United States of the past few days. He continued by saying, "Since France is powerless in the Far East, it is but natural that she should want to maintain the safety of French Indo‑China through the strength of Japanese leadership in A-449 </p> 5881088 2009-04-03 03:27:35 2009-04-03 03:27:35 open open darlan-handed-ambassador-kato-2-dar-111-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5881088 publish 0 0 post 0 kato Gaimudaijin 5.gai.993 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/03/26/gaimudaijin-5-gai-993-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5839126/ Thu, 26 Mar 2009 23:02:59 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>No. 530 FROM: Berlin May 19, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 567. (Chief of Office Routing). I had heard various rumors of Japanese‑U. S. negotiations in connection with rumors of your going to the United States. I learned for the first time on 5 May, from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, that the above was not mere idle rumor. However, guessing at your intentions, I told myself that this matter should be allowed to progress without my taking part in it. At the same time, I could not but feel considerable anxiety when I took into consideration the future of our country, and the effect that the proposal may have on the Tripartite Pact. Moreover, I feel that it is my duty as your representative, to report to you the attitude of the official circles in Germany as well as my humble opinions. I am, therefore, dispatching them to you in supplementary cables numbered 568 [a] and 569. [b] Another matter I would like to mention here concerns your reasons for not reporting this Understanding proposal to the Ambassadors in Germany and in Italy. I would like to take this opportunity to express my opinion in this connection. Please be assured of one thing: In critical times such as these, my first consideration is for the welfare of my country. I do not for even one second think about such things as personal trust or one's personal duties to another individual. Such matters as the formulation of foreign policy and the ways and means of carrying them out are entirely up to the Foreign Minister. The only point that I wonder at is your apparent disinterest in obtaining reports on the attitudes of the official circles of Italy and Germany with regard to such a matter as a U.S.‑Japanese agreement which, after all, would have considerable effect on the Tripartite Pact. I am sending the two supplementary messages so that you may be better acquainted with the reactions here. I feel that as long as I am the Ambassador to Germany, it is my duty to do this. [a] See II, 531. [b] See II, 532. Trans. 5‑21‑41 No. 531 FROM: Berlin (Osima) May 19, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 568. (In 6 parts‑complete). Part 1. Chief of Office Routing. On May 3rd, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop asked me to see him. At our interview he said, "Today I received a telegram from Ambassador Ott regarding Japanese‑American negotiations. As I understand that neither you nor the Japanese Ambassador at Rome is supposed to know about these negotiations, I suppose I should not mention it to you but because of the seriousness of this subject and our mutual friendship, I am unable to withhold the information from you any longer. I trust that you will fully understand the circumstances." So saying, he showed me a telegram from Ott, giving the main points of the four articles of the agreement proposed by the United States on April 16th. He then said, "Information regarding such a pro‑ A-266 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR posal coming out of a clear sky makes it very difficult for me to understand the motive of the Japanese government." Thereupon I avoided this subject by explaining that when Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Germany he made it very clear that the Tripartite Pact will be the basis of Japan's foreign policy. Therefore there was no point in promising that we will not do anything that will be inconsistent with the Pact. Again on the 9th Ribbentrop had me call on him. He showed me telegrams from Ambassador Ott giving Japan's provisional reply to the American proposal and also the conversation between Matsuoka and Ott held on May 6th. Ribbentrop then said, "It is now clear from other similar telegrams from Ambassador Ott, but it appears from Japan's provisional reply that Japan has already gone into these negotiations quite deeply. Speaking frankly, among information obtained from various sources, some indicate that these negotiations were originally proposed by Japan. Also the conversation between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Ott seems to show that the Foreign Minister was driven to agree to this course by a certain group in Japan. Another thing, the Foreign Minister is reported to have said during this conversation that in the event of German‑Soviet war Japan will also fight, but it now appears that Mr. Matsuoka has changed his mind regarding what he told me as his private view, on the occasion of his visit here, that Japan is about to attack Singapore. Part 2. "I doubt the sincerity of Roosevelt and it might be that Japan may be taken in by his group, or she might use this agreement to circumvent her obligation (under the Tripartite Pact) to fight when the moment arrives. It is true that many technical loop holes can be found to justify Japan's position but actually a thing like this will weaken the structure of the Tripartite Pact. Furthermore, it might cause Japan to loose the opportunity of gaining supremacy in East Asia. After giving this matter a considerable thought I have arrived at two proposals which may be considered as those of Germany. They are: "(a) Proposal to turn down the United States proposal. "(b) Proposal to agree to a Japanese‑American agreement on the condition that the United States abandon her plan for convoy and patrol services and maintain an absolute neutrality. "I personally am in favor of the first proposal and I would like to promote its acceptance, but what is your opinion regarding these proposals? I, therefore, told him that common sense indicates to me that our government would be more favorably disposed toward the second proposal, because if such an agreement were reached, Britain will have to fight Germany single-handed and for that reason will hasten the termination of the war. Also, although this might sound a bit too optimistic, Roosevelt and his group, realizing that aid to Britain is ineffective, may jump at this opportunity to retreat from their present policy of giving aid to Britain. Then again, it might prove useful in determining at least, Roosevelt's sincerity regarding aid to Britain, and at the same time may help to convince some of our countrymen the impossibility of Japanese‑American cooperation. Part 3. Ribbentrop then replied that so long as these negotiations continue, there is the danger of the United States trying to draw Japan away from Germany, (opinion already expressed in my message # 545, to Turkey # 11, and that it might also be used within the United States to silence the peace advocates by indicating that an understanding such as this will give the United States a free hand in the Atlantic. For these reasons, he said he could not agree with me. Then he explained that as these proposals have not yet been submitted to Hitler for his approval, he will telegraph my opinion with the proposals to Hitler tonight. (Hitler is now living outside Berlin.) A-267 When I asked him whether this matter has been taken up with the Italian government, he replied that the Italian Ambassador has already reported it to his home government but no direct conversations between the two governments have yet taken place, but as soon as Hitler's approval is obtained the German government will draw up instructions to Ambassador Ott and at that time the matter will be taken up direct, by both governments. Part 4. As I had made arrangements to see Mussolini early this month, I left for Rome on the 10th. The German Ambassador, Bismarck, called on me on the 12th and stating that he was under instructions from Ribbentrop, he showed me the German government's instructions to Ott and explained that Italy also was in accord. Upon reading the text I found that Hitler's approval was given to the proposal which was not supported by Ribbentrop. On the 13th Ribbentrop suddenly arrived in Rome by air to confer with Mussolini and Ciano. On the morning of the 14th he asked me to call on him. He showed me Ott's telegram describing the talk with you and he expressed a great dissatisfaction with your statement that due to the international situation the negotiations had to be started without awaiting the Italian and German views. Stating that if you had waited only a few hours longer you would have received them, he asked why it was that you were unable to wait. I therefore explained to him that while I do not know the facts of the situation and therefore can not make any positive statement, I thought that it might have been due to the necessity of assuring absolute secrecy and also because these matters had first to be submitted for Imperial approval. I assured him that no disrespect was intended either for Italy or Germany. Part 5. Nevertheless, Ribbentrop would not be appeased, and he said, "During Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Germany, I had talked with him on several occasions, but never once did he mention the Japanese‑American negotiations, which certainly have a great bearing on the Tripartite Pact. It is very strange that no sooner than he arrives home, we are confronted with reports on these negotiations. To speak bluntly, I personally think that these negotiations will greatly weaken the Pact, and just as I have mentioned before, from the very beginning, I have distrusted Roosevelt, and I had intended to suggest to Japan to abandon the negotiations with the United States, but it so turns out now that the instructions adopted support the proposal which was not of my choice". I therefore told him that no misunderstanding should arise over this question between the German and Japanese governments and suggested that he let Ott know of his misgivings on this question and also look into the whole thing very carefully. The same evening I called on Foreign Minister Ciano, but as Ribbentrop had already conferred with Mussolini and Ciano on this matter, what he had to say was no different from that of Ribbentrop's views. Part 6. I called on Vice Minister Weizsacker, at his request, as soon as I returned to Berlin on May 17th. He said he was under telegraphic instruction from Ribbentrop, who is now at FUSSHURU, and he showed me a telegram from Ott, dated the 14th, which dealt with Japan's reply to the United States proposal and another telegram, to Ott, giving the German government's instructions regarding the above. He then said that as he had been instructed only to show you these telegrams he does not intend to express his views but in view of the present war situation the German government is greatly concerned with the outcome of this question and that Germany also views with great interest Foreign Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ambassador Ott, to the effect that Japan will aid Germany in case of German‑Soviet war. He then asked me whether the Foreign. Minister was able to acquaint himself fully with the German‑Soviet relations, before returning to Japan. I replied that while I do not know what the A-268 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR Foreign Minister said about Japan's position in the event of German‑Soviet war, as all important questions today must await Imperial decision, whatever he said must have been simply his personal opinion. As for his understanding of the German‑Soviet relations, I am sure that there is little to worry about on this score, as he has had many opportunities to talk over this subject with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during his visit to Germany. Trans. 5‑22‑41 No. 532 FROM: Berlin (Osima) May 19, 1941 TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 569. (In 3 parts‑complete) Chief of Office Routing. 1. I reported in my separate cable [a] the fact that Germany is showing considerable dissatisfaction with regard to the proposed U.S.‑Japanese agreement, and that they show much concern over the future of the Tripartite Pact. From a practical viewpoint, the United States is involved in the war today. Should we remain silent with regard to the words and acts of the United States and enter into a Japanese-U. S. agreement, it would amount to the same thing in the eyes of many, as our giving approval to the violent anti‑Axis expressions and actions of the United States. From the viewpoint of international law, such an act would mean the prevention of U.S. entrance into the European war, but at the same time, it would indicate that Japan was evading her duty to enter the war. It would be impossible to dispel this doubt from the minds of the German people. At the time of your visit to Germany recently, the people outdid themselves in their expression of welcome to you. They publicized the fact that your visit was proof of strengthened ties among the Axis countries. Since this other matter came up immediately after this, there is considerable feeling here that they have been double‑crossed. 2. I am perfectly aware of the fact that there is a need for us to get a political and economic breathing spell by bringing about an immediate settlement of the China Affair. At the same time, the fortunes of the European war are constantly favoring Germany and Italy in an ever increasing degree. We can even foresee some very important developments within the next few months. Under such circumstances, would it be wise for us, for some immediate gains, to invite the animosity of Germany and Italy who will have the power over Europe? I have considerable doubts, myself. In other words, I suspect that this proposal made by the United States was motivated only by that country's desire to separate us from the Axis powers, and is purely a temporary stop‑gap effort on their part. I am afraid that if we pursue such a "middle of the road" diplomacy, we will be left standing alone on the international stage, at the critical period immediately following the war. 3. I shall not go into the fact at this moment that we will constantly be bearing a telltale scar in the future if settlement of the China Affair is brought through the lip‑service of the United States. However, if we were to abandon at this most opportune time all of our dreams with regard to the southward expansion and at the same time abandon our position as a threat to Singapore, A-269 I fear that we would be looked upon contemptuously not only by Britain and the United States, but by Germany and Italy as well. It is all very well from the U.S. standpoint to have a situation in which she need not be concerned of the future on the Pacific. She could then concentrate on her assistance to Britain, avoiding, all the time, openly declaring that she was in the war. Such a development could affect the war situation in Europe considerably, and it would be difficult for any to guarantee that nothing unfortunate would happen to Japan. Should we promise to the United States that we would abandon our claims for leadership in Greater East Asia, which naturally includes the territories in the southwest, it is clear that we could not insist upon the right of leadership to Germany and Italy. Hence, we would have to admit that we had abandoned our project of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia. 4. By the signing of the Tripartite Pact last fall, our nationals were given a clear goal to strive for. Should we, at this time, enter into an agreement with the United States, our people would become confused and be at a loss as to know what the ultimate goal is. In our international relations, such a step would invite suspicion and contempt of our friends. I fear that in reality this would mean that Japan would have to stand alone in the international scene. However, in the event that the government of Japan feels that it is absolutely necessary to enter into an agreement, it is highly desirous that the following two points be put into effect: (a) Clearly establish the fact that Japan is entering into the U.S.‑Japanese agreement so that Japan can make use of the position held by the United States to further bolster the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and at the same time make things easier for Germany and Italy in their war against England. I further believe that it is absolutely necessary that we demand of the United States that she change her policy with regard to the European war, to one of strict neutrality, and at the same time clearly establish the conditions of the Tripartite Pact under which it is our duty to enter the war. Should the United States refuse to accept these conditions, the agreement would not be entered into. (b) It would be to our biggest disadvantage if we allow the Germans and Italians to get the impression that the advocates of the status quo in our country (those who advocate the maintenance of the status quo in the Orient) have gained so much power that entering into this agreement was unavoidable. This would give the Germans and Italians the idea that we entered into agreement so as to evade entering into the war. Hence, I believe that it is necessary for us to exchange opinions with Germany and Italy, and have them clearly understand the points brought out in (a).http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US [a] See II, 531. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire </p> 5839126 2009-03-26 23:02:59 2009-03-26 23:02:59 open open gaimudaijin-5-gai-993-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5839126 publish 0 0 post 0 gaimudaijin flu Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/03/14/flu-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5753325/ Sat, 14 Mar 2009 04:44:01 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>Lab-made Proteins Neutralize Multiple Strains Of Seasonal And Pandemic Flu Ribbon diagram of the influenza virus H5 hemagglutinin (HA) surface protein bound by the F10 monoclonal antibody (red). The two chains of H5 are HA1 (yellow) and HA2 (blue). (Credit: Dr. Wayne A. Marasco, Dana-Farber) ScienceDaily (Feb. 23, 2009) — Scientists have identified a small family of lab-made proteins that neutralize a broad range of influenza A viruses, including the H5N1 avian virus, the 1918 pandemic influenza virus and seasonal H1N1 flu viruses. These human monoclonal antibodies, identical infection-fighting proteins derived from the same cell lineage, also were found to protect mice from illness caused by H5N1 and other influenza A viruses. Because large quantities of monoclonal antibodies can be made relatively quickly, after more testing, these influenza-specific monoclonal antibodies potentially could be used in combination with antiviral drugs to prevent or treat the flu during an influenza outbreak or pandemic. A report describing the research, supported by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National Institutes of Health as well as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, appears online in Nature Structural & Molecular Biology. Wayne Marasco, M.D., Ph.D., associate professor of medicine at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute and Harvard Medical School in Boston led the research team, which included collaborators from the Burnham Institute for Medical Research in La Jolla, Calif., and the CDC in Atlanta. "This is an elegant research finding that holds considerable promise for further development into a medical tool to treat and prevent seasonal as well as pandemic influenza," notes NIAID Director Anthony S. Fauci, M.D. "In the event of an influenza pandemic, human monoclonal antibodies could be an important adjunct to antiviral drugs to contain the outbreak until a vaccine becomes available." Using standard methods of production, initial doses of a new influenza vaccine to fight pandemic influenza would be expected to take four to six months to produce. Key to their research, Dr. Marasco and his colleagues discovered and described the atomic structure of an obscure but genetically stable region of the influenza virus to which their monoclonal antibodies bind. The hidden part of the influenza virus is in the neck below the peanut-shaped head of the hemagglutinin (HA) protein. HA and neuraminidase are the two main surface proteins on the influenza virus. The scientists also identified a new mechanism of antibody action against influenza: Once the antibody binds, the virus cannot change its shape, a step required before it can fuse with and enter the cell it is attempting to infect. Dr. Marasco, Jianhua Sui, M.D., Ph.D., and other Dana-Farber colleagues began their study with avian flu viruses. They scanned tens of billions of monoclonal antibodies produced in bacterial viruses, or bacteriophages, and found 10 antibodies active against the four major strains of H5N1 avian influenza viruses. Encouraged by these findings, they collaborated with Ruben O. Donis, Ph.D., of the CDC Influenza Division, and found that three of these monoclonal antibodies had broader neutralization capabilities when tested in cell cultures and in mice against representative strains of other known influenza A viruses. Influenza A viruses can include any one of the 16 known subtypes of HA proteins, which fall into two groups, Group 1 and Group 2. Their monoclonal antibodies neutralized all testable viruses containing the 10 Group 1 HAs--which include the seasonal H1 viruses, the H1 virus that caused the 1918 pandemic and the highly pathogenic avian H5 subtypes--but none of the viruses containing the six Group 2 HAs. Simultaneously, Dr. Marasco's group teamed up with Robert C. Liddington, Ph.D., professor and chair of the Infectious and Inflammatory Disease Center at Burnham, to determine the atomic structure of one of their monoclonal antibodies bound to the H5N1 HA. Their detailed picture shows one arm of the antibody inserted into a genetically stable pocket in the neck of the HA protein, an interaction that blocks the shape change required for membrane fusion and virus entry into the cell. When they surveyed more than 6,000 available HA genetic sequences of the 16 HA subtypes, they found the pockets to be very similar within each Group but to be significantly different between the two Groups. The genetically stable pockets, they note, may be a result of evolutionary constraints that enable virus-cell fusion. This could also explain why they did not detect so-called escape mutants, viruses that elude the monoclonal antibodies through genetic mutation. "One of the most remarkable findings of our work is that we identified a highly conserved region in the neck of the influenza hemagglutinin protein to which humans rarely make antibodies," says Dr. Marasco. "We believe this is because the head of the hemagglutinin protein acts as a decoy by constantly undergoing mutation and thereby attracting the immune system to produce antibodies against it rather than against the pocket in the neck of the protein." Their findings could also assist vaccine developers. Current influenza vaccines target the constantly mutating head of the HA protein and do not readily generate antibodies against the conserved region in the neck. "An important goal is to redirect the immune response of vaccines to this invariable region of the hemagglutinin to try to obtain durable lifelong immunity," Dr. Marasco states. The monoclonal antibodies identified in their paper are very well-characterized, Dr. Marasco notes, and he is optimistic about their further clinical development. "These are fully human monoclonal antibodies that are ready for advanced preclinical testing," he says. He currently is arranging to use NIAID research resources to take the next steps: first, testing the antibodies in ferrets, the gold standard animal model for influenza, and then developing a clinical grade version of one antibody that could enter human clinical trials as soon as 18 months from when the development program begins. Should the antibodies prove safe and effective in humans, it could take several years to develop a licensed product. Despite the availability of influenza drugs and vaccines, seasonal influenza still kills more than 250,000 people worldwide each year. During seasonal flu outbreaks, monoclonal antibodies could be used to treat individuals with impaired immunity due to pre-existing medical conditions or advanced age. In the event of an influenza pandemic, these individuals plus others at risk--for example, first responders and medical personnel and exposed family members and coworkers--could also benefit from this type of therapy. Journal reference: 1. J Sui et al. Structural and functional bases for broad-spectrum neutralization of avian and human influenza A viruses. Nature Structural & Molecular Biology, DOI: 10.1038/nsmb.1566 (2009) Adapted from materials provided by NIH/National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.</p> 5753325 2009-03-14 04:44:01 2009-03-14 04:44:01 open open flu-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5753325 publish 0 0 post 0 flu 10052378 Cristian http://wordpress.com/ 127.0.0.1 2009-06-01 19:33:31 2009-06-01 19:33:31 As I said many times: the <a rel="follow" href="http://www.china-linhai.com/online-clinic.html">flu virus</a> that all newspapers and televisions speak about right now, creates more panic than actual deaths. 1 0 0 abie-baby 6.ae.9990 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/03/03/abie-baby-6-ae-9990-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5683034/ Tue, 03 Mar 2009 01:31:37 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO From the archive The Republican President's Creed Nov 24th 1860 From The Economist print edition THE success of the Republican candidate for the Presidency in the United States will prove one of the greatest events of modern times, if it indicates, as we trust, no mere accidental fluctuation of public opinion in the direction of the Anti- Slavery cause, but the commencement of a permanent and sustained movement. It will be impossible to say how far this will prove to be as we should wish, till we see the details of the popular vote. It is a discouraging fact that the Republican President will not at first be supported by a Republican majority in either House or Congress, but there is good reason to hope that, now the tide has fairly turned, this defect may be remedied at the next Congressional elections. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Mr Abraham Lincoln is an extreme man. His views seem to us to fall far short of what may fairly be termed even a statesmanlike Anti-Slavery creed. Few in England have the smallest sympathy with the extreme party of Abolition,—those who maintain that to hold a serf for a single day in slavery after you have the power to release him is a deadly sin,—that Washington and Jefferson deserve infamy for holding slaves themselves, and admitting any compromise on the subject into the Constitution of the United States. This kind of fanaticism is a species of political insanity. The statesman will believe that the order of the most imperfect Government is better than anarchy, especially if it contain within it principles by which it may be gradually purified and improved. He will accept his position and use all the means within his reach to improve it. He will not throw away the only political instruments within his power because they are indelibly marked with traces of the evil he wishes to remove. It is not, therefore, because Mr Abraham Lincoln is very far from representing the extreme party of Abolition that we call his views moderate within the limits of statesmanlike moderation. But few Englishmen, only knowing that the Anti-Slavery candidate for the Presidency has at last triumphed, would be prepared to hear what his views really are. That they have roused the South to threats of immediate secession, which in some cases at least may not improbably be in part carried into effect, will scarcely be credited when we lay before our readers what the new President's creed on the Slavery question really is. He is not opposed to a Fugitive Slave Law, though he would modify the one actually in operation. He thinks it would be impossible to uphold the Constitution as between Slave States and Free States without some Fugitive Slave Law, so long as Slave States exist at all. He has not, we believe, declared himself as yet even in favour of prohibiting the internal Slave Trade between the different States,—a measure which is the only efficient step towards the extinction of slavery that is constitutionally within the power of Congress to effect. He has declared himself in favour of abolishing slavery within the Congressional district of Columbia (in which the capital Washington stands), but only under conditions which would entirely obliterate all the revolutionary character of the measure,—namely, that it should be done gradually,—that it should be done only with the consent of a majority of the qualified voters within the district,—and that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. We have enumerated the three principal articles of a statesmanlike Anti-Slavery creed,—and in two of them Mr Lincoln declares himself either uncertainly, or only in favour of very modified proposals, while on the third he attaches such careful conditions to his adhesion that all its terror to the slaveowners ought to be obliterated. About two years ago he stated, in his controversy with Mr Douglas: "I do not now, nor ever did stand in favour of the unconditional repeal of the Slave Trade Law. I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave Law. Having said that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave Law further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it without lessening its efficacy." With regard to the abolition of the internal Slave Trade between the different States, Mr Lincoln says : "I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorised to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it...I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the Slave Trade among the different States, I should not be in favour of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative principle, as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the district of Columbia." Hearing this, some of our English politicians will be tempted not only to wonder at the dismay of the South, but to ask where is the gain to the Anti-Slavery cause in the election of so very moderate and cautious a Republican. But, in truth, the gain is incalculable. Whatever compromises Mr Lincoln may concede to the South with respect to the limits and the right use of the Congressional or Presidential power, he stands irrevocably pledged to the principle that slavery is wrong, and that the national power, so far as it can be fairly used at all, must be used to limit, to repress, to promote its extinction. These are his words: “I think we want and must have a national policy in regard to the institution of slavery, that acknowledges and deals with that institution as being wrong. Whoever desires the prevention of the spread of slavery and the nationalisation of that institution, yields all, when he yields to any policy that either recognises slavery as being right, or as being an indifferent thing. Nothing will make you successful but setting up a policy which shall treat the thing as being wrong. When I say this, I do not mean to say that the General Government is charged with the duty of redressing or preventing all the wrongs in the world; but I do think that it is charged with preventing and redressing all wrongs which are wrong to itself. This Government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare. We believe—nay, we know, that that is the only thing that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union itself. The only thing which has ever menaced the destruction of the Government under which we live, is this very thing. To repress this thing, we think, is providing for the general welfare.” And he stands explicitly pledged to exterminate, so far as he can do so, the external Slave Trade,—and on the coast of Cuba a co-operation of English and American cruisers will effect this. He stands pledged to abolish slavery in Columbia (the district round Washington) under the conditions we have shown. He stands pledged to oppose and prohibit, so for as he can, the introduction of slavery into the Territories. And though he has refused to pledge himself to resist the admission of new Slave States, his whole influence will be exerted to give the free party in such States ample means for the fair expression of their wishes on the subject. Yet, on the whole, no doubt the great importance of the election is less in its immediate results than in showing that the tide of public opinion is turning against slavery in the States. We must remember what this means. It is far more significant than the expression of conviction which an English election gives. The most bitter opponent of pure democracy,—and none regard its evils in a graver light than ourselves,—must admit that when the least enlightened, the worst opinion of a nation, at last after a long hesitation, declares against a national crime, the victory is more complete than it would be where the best intelligence and culture of a nation declares against it. The more absolutely we are convinced that universal suffrage in America drowns the voice of the best educated and most refined classes in the North, the better satisfied must we be to learn from the elections there that the public opinion is turning against slavery. It shows that the dread and opposition to it has become general at a social level which might remain comparatively unaffected in England, in spite of a perfect unanimity amongst the electoral classes here. The strength of a chain is tested by its least reliable links,—and the least reliable links of the social chain in the Northern States have proved to us that they are strong enough now to resist the bribes and menaces of the Southern party. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO </p> 5683034 2009-03-03 01:31:37 2009-03-03 01:31:37 open open abie-baby-6-ae-9990-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5683034 publish 0 0 post 0 abe hess 4.hes.9952 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/02/26/hess-4-hes-9952-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5657063/ Thu, 26 Feb 2009 23:30:09 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>No. 513 FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) July 26, 1941 TO: Ottawa # 1619 Circular. Message to London (?) # 233. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire On the 25th I asked the British Ambassador to call and informed him of the mutual agreement, reached between Japan and France for the joint defense of French Indo‑China. I told him that this agreement came about as a result of alarming reports leading to fear that the existence and safety of French Indo‑China (sic). It was arrived at in a friendly atmosphere for the purpose of guaranteeing the safety of French Indo‑China, the maintenance of peace, and to oppose any enveloping movement against Japan. I explained that it was purely a defensive arrangement against the attack of any third party and that the Imperial Japanese Government will strictly observe its obligation to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo‑China. The British Ambassador replied that there was no foundation for the alarming reports which I spoke of and that it was an exceedingly regrettable matter that Japan should use them for an excuse to advance, in spite of the fact that the British Government had warned her that such action might lead to serious consequences. He continued in the vein expressed by EDEN in his address in Parliament on the same day, that Japan's steps in French Indo-China could not but be considered by the British Government as a potential threat to British territory and rights and interests in Asia. He then withdrew, but in another visit today, when I informed him of the contents of my Circular # 1615 [a], prefacing his remarks by the statement that this was merely his own opinion, he said that he thought surely some compromise could be reached by which the dispatch of troops could be postponed until such time as the truth or falsity of the aforementioned "alarming report" could be determined. To this I responded that I regretted I was in no position to accept his suggestion; however, England need have no fear as to the peaceful nature and purpose of Japan's present conduct. [a] Not available. Trans. 8‑6‑41 A-254 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 514 FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 26, 1941 TO: Vancouver, London and Washington # 21. Circular. Message to Tokyo # 111. After my interview recounted to you in my # 110 [a], the Premier gave me the official text which I sent in my separate wire # 112 [b]. He said: "I have received a report from the English Ambassador in Tokyo and though we regret it very much, the Canadian Government will have to take similar steps. Please communicate this immediately to your Government. Though Canada has never done this before, under the present circumstances such direct retaliations have to be made and in our opinion this makes impossible the conclusion of a Canadian-Japanese commercial treaty. It is hoped that further sweeping measures will not have to be taken." With regard to this communication, should there be anything that you might like to add to my acknowledgment, please let me know at once. [a] See II, 516 which tells of an interview with the Canadian Premier at the time of the termination of the Canadian-Japanese commercial treaty. [b] See II, 515 which gives the text of the official note sent the Japanese Government terminating the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. Trans. 8‑12‑41 No. 515 FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 27, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 112. The Government of Canada has had under consideration the operation, under present conditions, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which was signed in London on April 3, 1911. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, the notice of adhesion in respect to Canada was given on May 1, 1913. The Government of Canada has reached the conclusion that this treaty can no longer be regarded as fulfilling the objects which the Government of Canada had in mind at the time of adhesion. I have the honor, therefore, to give notice, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of the treaty, of the intention of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, in respect of Canada, to terminate the same. The treaty will cease to have effect upon the expiration of a period of twelve months from this date, etc., etc. http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us Trans. 8‑4‑41 A-255 No. 516 FROM: Ottawa (Yoshizawa) July 26, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 110. To Vancouver as circular # 20. Re my message # 106 [a]. (Three parts‑complete). On the 26th, I asked for an interview and went to call on the Premier. I said, "I wired last night's statement direct to Tokyo, so in any event, I will receive some instructions from my country concerning the views of the Japanese Empire and the counter measures it proposes to take. However, for the time being, I cannot help feeling a deep depression because you know how hard I have worked to maintain relations between Japan and Canada. I just wanted to tell you frankly how hurt I am and to question you on two or three points. I also wish to comment on these points myself." Prefacing my talk thus, I continued. "First of all did Canada do this, acting as one link in a comprehensive imperial anti‑Japanese move?" The Premier replied, "Canada saw that what has been happening in the Southern Pacific was a threat to her independence. It was in order to forestall danger there that this step was taken." I then asked, "What earthly connection is there between French Indo‑China and the safety of Canada?" The Premier retorted, "Let me revise my previous statement a little. Supposing for the moment that there will be no immediate direct effect on Canada. British territories in that area certainly do feel in imminent peril. Does not this have a direct relevancy to the security of the British Empire taken as a whole? How can we feel safe when such things happen? Canada merely felt in the common interest it was up to her to take some steps to cope with the situation. You know the members of the British Commonwealth must act with some unity of purpose." I answered, "Well, as for me, I can see little rapport between this measure on the part of the British Empire as a whole and the situation with which it is supposed to cope. Whether or not the British Empire has been in any sort of contact with the United States of America I do not know, but I do know that the United States stretched forth her hand and seized Greenland and Iceland, proclaiming that this was necessary in the interests of hemisphere defense. Well, now our ideal is an East‑Asian sphere of co‑prosperity and by the same logic as was used by the United States, say in Iceland, we occupied French Indo‑China. We had even more reason to do so. I cannot but feel that the measures you have taken are very inopportune and designed to preclude our peaceful penetration into areas necessary to our existence." The Premier replied, "The case of Iceland is entirely different from this. If the United States had not secured it, there was a very real danger of the Nazis getting a foothold there and striking at the Western Hemisphere. Now, on the question of whether England and the United States would have attacked French Indo‑China if Japan had not gotten there beforehand there is a great difference of opinion. I replied, "Well, as to whether or not England was threatening French Indo‑China, I, myself am not in a position to say either `yea' or `nay'. But we Japanese do feel quite sure that the thing that has been thwarting our efforts to settle the China question has been Anglo‑American aid to CHIANG KAI‑SHEK. At last it is up to us to put an end to that. Do you think it too much to call this assistance that I have been speaking of a sort of threat? I heard, too, that the de GAULLIST's were up to mischief in French Indo‑China. So, have it how you will. We figure that we have reason aplenty to penetrate that country. We talked it over with Vichy, A-256 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR didn't we? Vichy saw our point and did not argue. Furthermore, we did it all peaceably and then what happens? Along comes England and the United States, working out a joint blockade preparatory to applying unendurable economic pressure against us Japanese. So you see how sorry and discouraged I feel. I cannot see how you all hope to secure the peace of the Pacific by an encirclement policy like this." The Premier replied, "In any event, despite seemingly logical arguments, it is not right to resort to force." I did not wish to go into the matter too deeply and get into a quarrel with him, so in conclusion I asked what the phrase, "in accordance with the desires of CHIANG KAI‑SHEK," in the statement meant and where it came from. The Premier replied that if he remembered rightly CHIANG had recently made some requests through the London Government. [a] Not available. Trans. 8‑6‑41 No. 517 FROM: Rome (Horikiri) May 14, 1941 TO: Tokyo No number. From Ambassador OSHIMA. [a] After talking to Premier MUSSOLINI on the 12th, Foreign Minister CIANO requested an interview with me on the 13th. The gist of our conversations on the occasion of Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP's visit to Rome is as follows: CIANO began by saying that the questions of most importance to Germany and Italy at the present time were, first, the HESS incident and, second, America's attitude. "With regard to the HESS incident, Your Excellency too has heard all the details from Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP and there is nothing which I can add to that except to say that I believe that Britain and the United States will make great use of this in their propaganda; but within a few days it will have been forgotten. "Regardless of what you might have to say about America's attitude, insofar as it affects the carrying out of the attack against England, it is of vital importance. Nevertheless, it is our hope that Japan, taking a strong position with regard to America's ultimate attitude regardless of whether she looks at it from the point of view of the character of the Tripartite Alliance or from the consideration of her own future rights and interest, will not permit the possibility of America's freedom of action in the Atlantic becoming an actuality." http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us I then replied: "I do not know whether there are currently any conversations in progress between Japan and the United States; but inasmuch as the Tripartite Alliance is the foundation of Japanese diplomacy and we have received the support of the entire country, I am confident that Japan will enter into absolutely nothing which is contrary to the interests of Germany and Italy." Continuing my conversations by changing the subject, I inquired of German‑Soviet relations. To which, CIANO replied: "Of course, I have had absolutely no information from Germany but, speaking for myself and myself alone, my impression, and it does not exceed that, is that the relations between the two countries recently have taken an ever worsening trend. Don't you think that in the light of Germany this day ‑‑‑‑ that the outbreak of war between A-257 Germany and the Soviet is virtually inevitable?" When he said that, I got the impression from CIANO's manner that Communism was the great danger. Relayed to Germany. [a] Japanese Ambassador to Germany. Trans. 5‑16‑41 No. 518 FROM: Rome May 14, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 272. Strictly secret. From Ambassador OSHIMA. [a] On the afternoon of the 13th Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP visited Rome. This morning, in order to pay my respects, I called upon him. He prefaced his remarks by saying that he had come to Rome in view of the necessity of discussing with Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO various questions relating to the Tripartite Agreement, the Iraqi question and the HESS incident. In this message, I am wiring the details of his comments with regard to the HESS incident in his own words. "For the past few years HESS has been greatly troubled by a gall bladder ailment. In order to forget the agony of that ailment he became as astrological faddist, frequently conjuring castles in the air out of his fancies. Though he occupied a position of prominence in the party as acting FUEHRER, it is a fact that he knew little or nothing about political questions. As a confident of the Fuehrer for many years in whom much personal confidence was felt, he personally worked hard in not a little contribution in the present conflict and, with the view of working upon the Fascist element of Great Britain in order to bring about the conclusion of the offensive against England with as little sacrifice and loss of life as possible, he has believed that they should bring about the downfall of Prime Minister CHURCHILL. In order to carry this out, he tried to get HITLER to look with favor upon his plan. This was to use a British subject, the Duke of Hamilton, with whom he had become acquainted, in matters dealing with an aerial survey of Mount Everest, but this man is absolutely anti‑German and is now an aviator for the British Army. "Recently HESS has shown absolutely no aptitude for foreign policy. "This person, HAMILTON, originally was pro‑German but later became anti‑German. At the present time, I do not know but what he may be actually participating in the war. On the other hand, should CHURCHILL welcome him, the Fascist faction of Great Britain, which has long admired the name of RUDOLPH HESS, will, he had thought quickly rally around him. Aware as we are that his mind is not normal, we do not consider the acts of this unhappy official treasonable even to the slightest extent. Though in his sections he has strayed from the normal path, it is clear that he entertained but the best intentions. "In spite of the fact that this has added fuel to British and American anti‑German propaganda, the above facts will be made known within a few days." Relayed to France and Russia, England, United States, Germany and ‑‑‑‑‑. Relay to England and France. [a] Japanese Ambassador to Germany. Trans. 5‑15‑41 A-258 THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR No. 519 FROM: Berlin May 14, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 540. (Part 1 of 2). To be handled in Government Code. A certain authoritative German told me confidentially with regard to the HESS incident as follows: "1. The recent incident has amazed the German people no end and there is no question about it. It is clear that it has truly had a great effect upon them. Regardless of how I might explain it, it would be difficult to make one understand through a logical process. The way it is being publicized, too, places the German citizens in an awkward position. Should we say that HESS was ill, then why has he been allowed to maintain the position of Acting Fuehrer? And, if so, how was it possible for him of his own accord to take an airplane, fly it to its destination in Great Britain, and make a landing within a short distance of the spot where he wanted to land? And, though one were to try to explain it, there is nothing that one can say except that it is an incident peculiar to a nation which is built upon a foundation of dictatorship, as this man was and is a warm personal friend of Chancellor HITLER, who is the sole authority in all Germany. "2. It goes without saying that HESS was mentally ill just as it was reported and also that he, during his early years, received a British schooling. It is believable, therefore, that he was strongly pro‑British in his leanings. Since the time, back in 1923, when he helped edit Mein Kampf, his ideas have not changed one whit and this only goes to show his over-zealousness. For, since that time, one cannot overlook the enormous changes in the world situation as far as Germany's position is concerned. Since 1923 an era has passed. For the above reasons he, aside from having Chancellor HITLER's personal confidence, has for these many years differed slightly in his thinking and one cannot doubt but what he is anxious to leave Germany ‑‑‑‑‑ -‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑. Looking at it in the light of present‑day developments, one cannot but say that it was wrong to permit him to hold such an office as Acting Fuehrer but, as for Chancellor HITLER, his faithfulness to this man is well brought out in his attitude toward him. Furthermore, because HITLER will not change in his attitude toward HESS, at the present time we cannot but regard him as a disillusioned individual." Trans. 5‑20‑41 No. 520 FROM: Berlin May 14, 1941 TO: Tokyo # 540. (Part 2 of 2). To be handled in Government code. "3. In HESS's letter which he left he said that, should this present war be allowed to continue, it would mean not only the downfall of Great Britain but the destruction of the whole European civilization. Sacrificing himself, therefore, he said that he would strive for the reconciliation of Germany and England. This, he said, would be possible through conversations with a certain individual in that country. (He went there with the intention of conducting con- http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us A-259 versations with Lord HAMILTON who resided in the neighborhood of Glasgow. This person, being a pro‑German Britisher, was a man of considerable fame and an old friend of HESS's.) Having achieved his purpose, he said that he would return, etc., etc. It is certain that this man, mentally ill, with this naive motive, undertook to do the impossible. Though he had absolutely no intention of selling out his own country, for all that there is no doubt but that he did not have control of all his faculties. Though this does not mean that he was crazy, one cannot help but say that he was certainly not a normal man. "4. In order that he, HESS, might bring to a conclusion this inevitable war against England, he had not conversed overmuch with Chancellor HITLER. Furthermore, it is actually true that he had a great personal dislike for Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP who is very close to Chancellor HITLER. In summing this all up, not only was he extremely ignorant of current German diplomatic policy but in a sense he ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑. Therefore, in the light of the current incident, there is not a single chance that one could possibly expect any kind of change in German foreign policy. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire "5. This incident, in view of HESS's position, had a profound effect upon all of the people. Especially the blow dealt to the Party was enormous and the influence of the Party in actual politics has again further diminished. However, Chancellor HITLER and GOERING, together with the brains of the military group, are of one mind. There is no doubt that in the progress of the war today this incident is but a minor episode. Should England and America dream that because of this incident there is a division within the ranks in Germany, they can only be disappointed." Trans. 5‑20‑41 </p> 5657063 2009-02-26 23:30:09 2009-02-26 23:30:09 open open hess-4-hes-9952-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5657063 publish 0 0 post 0 hess crete 4.cre.00040 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/02/25/crete-4-cre-00040-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5649818/ Wed, 25 Feb 2009 19:59:28 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>No. 38 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) August 15, 1941 TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) #454.http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com Part 1.[a] 1. New types of automatic firearms used by the Red Army ("B" (OTSU) Intelligence). (a) '40 type automatic rifle. (b) '40 type super automatic rifle. (c) BERGMANN type automatic pistol (PPD). [27] 2. The automatic rifle is 600 grams lighter than the '38 type and (?8.5?) MM shorter in overall length. (Let us know if you want the details on the method of use of this rifle since we can supply that data.) [a] Part 2 follows separately, as V, 39. Trans. 3-2-45 No. 39 FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) August 15, 1941 TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) #454. Part 2. 3. Details of automatic pistol (prisoner's statement). (a) Caliber—7.62 mm (b) Over-all length—783 mm (sic) (c) Weight—3,149 kilograms (sic) (d) The magazine holds 25 cartridges (e) It has been reported that they were going to equip every rifle squad with one of these weapons, but at present there are only between 2 and 3 to a company. 1st and 2nd Lieutenants and (?guerrilla?) leaders also carry them. Trans. 3-14-45 No. 40 FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) August 24, 1941 TO: Circular (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff) #469. Red Air Force Intelligence. ("B" (OTSU) Intelligence—prisoner's statements.) 1. The P-2 divebomber type plane is twin-engined and resembles the ME-110. The tail, however, comes to a sharp point. Very few of these planes have appeared on the eastern front. 2. The pursuit plane I-17 is called the MIK-1 (MIKOYAN), the I-18 is called the MIK-2. 3. A TB-7 type heavy bomber regiment is made up of three companies. Trans. 3-2-45 No. 41 FROM: WER September 13, 1941 TO: ? #323. To the Chief of the General Affairs Department (SOMUBU). From the attache in Hungary. Re Tokyo wire #349[a]. 1. The 1st people's defense division and the 1st National Army Division seem to be in the 48th army; however, they are probably last-ditch reserves. [28] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR 2. The Russian army rifle divisions regulation war strength is 18,500; however, now it has declined to between 1,500 and 2,000; at best, it is 3,000. There are 72 full divisions. [a] Not readable. Trans. 4-25-45 No. 42 FROM: Helsinki (HELGS) October 10, 1941 TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN (Head, Gen. Affairs Dept.)) #538. We have received the following materials from the Finnish General Staff and will send them to you after duplicating them. 1. Complete range tables for the 1938 type 152 MM howitzer. 2. Regulations for Red Army rail transport. 3. Chemical war-fare clothing. 4. 120 MM and 52 MM mortars. (We will copy the range tables if you need them.) 5. A.T. mines "TM" 35 and "TMD" 40 typed. We are using our allotted funds for this and will ask for more money should we need it. Trans. 4-21-45 No. 43 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) May 8, 1941 TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff) #204. The German War Ministry has requested us to collect the following intelligence for them as regards Britain. Please report at once any data suitable for use in exchange of intelligence (actual figures as much as possible). 1. Amount of various types of foodstuffs in storage, and degrees of restriction. 2. Degree of decline in production capacity suffered by the various industries because of German bombings. Trans. 3-8-45 No. 44 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) May 12, 1941 TO: Tokyo (AUTUMN) (Head, General Affairs Dept.) #235. According to what I heard from JAKOBSEN, German military strength (?at present?) amounts to between 9,000,000 and 9,500,000 men. The army has 270 to 275 divisions. From January of this year to the present, 35 new divisions have been organized. The Air Force has 35,000 planes at present. Trans. 3-2-45 [29] No. 45 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) May 24, 1941 TO: Hsinking (GUNSANBOCHO) #297. Please send us the gist of the recent activities of BORYS MARKIW and his party, who were sent from a Ukrainian nationalist group here (the KONOVALETZ Party) to Harbin. Also, please let us know the manner in which your army had been treating them. This group is in very close contact with Berlin, and we will act in accordance with your army's plans as far as their activities in the Far East are concerned. Trans. 2-14-45 No. 46 FROM: Rome (ITRRK) May 25, 1941 TO: Circular (Moscow, Tokyo) (Summer) (Vice Chief General Staff) #282. Part 1[a]. 1. Since the 20th, the Germans have been dropping paratroops on Crete in the area southwest of Canea and south of Candia. These forces at present amount to about 10,000 men and they are at present battling the British troops. The British forces are composed of 2 divisions of Australians and New Zealand troops and some Greek units. 2. On the 20th, the Italian Air Force hit a 10,000 ton cruiser with (a) torpedo(s). On the 21st, the Italian Navy sank a 5,000 ton cruiser, and on the night of the 20th, Italian Navy MASU[b]torpedoed an enemy cruiser. On the 22nd, an Italian destroyer squadron attacked an enemy force composed chiefly of cruisers, and sank a 5,000 ton DIDO class cruiser. Other Italian fleet units sank a 9,000 ton LEANDER class cruiser. [a] Part 2 not available. [b] Midget subs perhaps. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Trans. 2-2-45 </p> 5649818 2009-02-25 19:59:28 2009-02-25 19:59:28 open open crete-4-cre-00040-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5649818 publish 0 0 post 0 http://41002louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com RIKUGUNJIKAN 0.rik.5554 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/01/23/rikugunjikan-0-rik-5554-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5428780/ Fri, 23 Jan 2009 04:15:02 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) June 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN, Vice Minister of War) #478. (?Part 1?)[a] Committee wire #38. Following are the results up to the present of an investigation concerning PO[b] company cartridge cases. 1. There is a possibility of introducing the manufacturing process for these cartridge cases into Japan (there is no patent on it). 2. We will obtain technical experts. We are limited to 3 types, a —1G— of a caliber of 7.7 mm., a 47 mm. anti-tank gun, and a 75 mm. in the above calibers in our estimated requirements please let us know immediately. 3. After reaching an agreement, it will be possible to get practical instruction in the PO[b] matter of sending technical experts to Japan from Germany who will supervise manufacture. [a] See Part 2, next message. [b] Probably POLTE. Trans. 3-30-45 [40] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) June 26, 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNJIKAN (Vice Minister of War)) #478. Part 2. 4. The nature of the steel to be used will be revealed by the PO[a] Company following the completion of the contract. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO Patent rights for the steel used by this company are held by KRUPP and we are negotiating separately with KRUPP to acquire the manufacturing rights. 5. In order to study manufacture and to produce the necessary production equipment, it will be necessary to have the official drawings of the brass cartridge cases for the calibers mentioned above. We want to have these sent as soon as the means of transport is determined. 6. The estimate for the manufacturing (?rights?) including testing apparatus for the manufacturing equipment of the Navy's OERLIKON 20 mm high angle machine cannon is 400,000 marks. For your reference. [a] Probably POLTE. Trans. 6-26-45 FROM: Berlin (GMBRK) August 14, 1941 TO: Tokyo (RIKUGUNSHO FUKKAN (WAR OFFICE, SEN. ADJUTANT)) #099. 2 Parts Complete. Part 1. Berlin technical wire (Berlin Technical Headquarters wire #68[a]). To the Chief of the Technical Headquarters. 1. High-frequency—2G— We are reporting, for your reference, the results of experiments in regard to the reflection of electric waves by airplanes. Wave length used: 20 meters Plane used: KJ 32 type (—1G— for sports use) 180. Flying altitudes: 200, 500, 1000, 2000 meters. The effect of the plane, which is over the receiving station is measured with a distance of 35 kilometers between the sending and receiving stations. As a result of these tests it has been determined that calculations in regard to the DOPPLER effect are in exact agreement with actual results and that the volume of reflection from the plane, although differing in accordance with the location and altitude of the plane is about half that of the waves sent up from the ground. Part 2. Although nothing has been reported here in regard to long waves; England and America, as reported in Berlin technical wire #12[b], are, contrary to expectations, actually using (extremely?) long waves. This field seems to require study as well. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire [a] Could be "88". [b] Not available. Trans. 7-9-45 [41] FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY) (Vice Minister of War) September 5, 1941 TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) #393. Parts 1 and 2. Part 1. Committee wire #44. Re: (?Your wires?) #46[a], 51[a], and 55[a]. 1. There has been no change in our resolution to acquire the "IG" process. However, since we don't know Germany's conditions for the transfer of patents concerned in this matter, we cannot proceed in our studies in regard payments, etc., and find it extremely difficult to make suggestions in regard to the application of the (?terms?) of the economic pact. Since this is the situation, please refer to paragraph #2 and then begin negotiations through the ambassador— and please be sure at least to try to get Germany's fundamental approval and to sound her out on the conditions which will be imposed. Part 2. On August 29 the following requests were made to WOHL TAT —3G—: (a) The Japanese Army is extremely anxious, even after so many years, to acquire the "IG" patent rights. Trans. 9-9-45 FROM: Tokyo (JTQRY (Vice-Minister of War)) September 5, 1941 TO: Berlin (RIKUGUN) #393. Part 4[a]. He replied: "Although I suppose it is because it was merely added that Lt. Col. YOKOTA, who is in Berlin, will handle the matter, there has been no report that he has been chosen as negotiator. We are in accord in regard to the "IG" transfer; however, there is the fact that, just as Japan feels about America, Germany, for her part, does not wish to goad (? her enemy ?).http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO 4. Since we are still studying the question of acquiring synthetic oil materials, we will wire you later in that regard. [a] Parts 1 and 2 same number; part 3 not available. Trans. 9-10-45 FROM: Tokyo (HSZRY (War Office Sen. Adjutant)) September 5, 1941 TO: Berlin (Rikugun) #980. 3 parts complete. Part 1. Air Headquarters wire. Reply to Berlin wire #687[a]. 1. We have decided upon the purchase of the JUNKERS propeller; therefore, please take the following steps to close the contract immediately. 2. After purchasing the samples, machinery, plans, and the like immediately for the home production of this propeller, you will make arrangements for sending them to Japan, using German shipping facilities. You will contract for the purchase of as many as possible, considering the danger of sinkings while en route to Japan. [42] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR 3. Please have a minimum number of these plans duplicated and have SUZUKI of NICHIGAKU[b] carry them to Japan. He will return to Japan by the same means used by diplomatic couriers. 4. After completing the contract with —1G—, Engineer SANUKI of NICHIGAKU[b] will remain for training in the (German) factory. Part 2 5. Since it is necessary from the standpoint of formalities concerning the remittances, etc., in Japan, please report immediately the minimum list of goods which are being sent and the estimated potential home production as referred to in paragraph #3, as well as the amount of money necessary for the articles and contract purchases, etc., as outlined in paragraph #2. 6. After the amalgamation of the JUNKERS Company with the MANHI Company, because the JUNKERS' obligations will be transferred to the MANHI Company____ Part 3. it has been decided that we will receive the transfer of the patent rights for this propeller from MANHI for a sum of money. For the present please contract for these patent rights to be used only by the NICHIGAKU[b] Company, and, because of this, bear in mind the necessity for keeping the contract price low. Colonel IJIMA was advised of this matter by MUHLEN, Director of JUNKERS. [a] Not available. [b] Abbreviation for NIPPON GAKKI SEIZO HAMAMATSU. Trans. 6-22-45 FROM: Tokyo September 6, 1941 TO: Singapore #249. (Secret.) Message to Batavia #558[a]. The APC wired to RA that if it would pay the expense in advance, permission would be given for the loading of the Eiyo Maru which has been anchored at Singapore since September 2 for the purpose of taking on Tung oil and gasoline, and so on the 3rd of this month, RA remitted 800,000 yen to the Bank of Java through the Yokohama Specie Bank. I understand that although this money has already been transferred to the BPM, no permission has been issued for this ship. The ship is still waiting. If the money has been paid to the BPM, will you please request the authorities in your city to issue a permit at once for the loading of the same and then let me know the results. [a] See Vol. III, Appendix Message Number 1163. Trans. 12-9-41 FROM: Washington (UAWRK) September 20, 1941 TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (Vice Chief, Gen Staff)) #196. Parts 1-6 complete. Answer to your wire #949[a]. A. Today, the 20th, I conferred with the German Attache. We exchanged opinions in a roundabout way, without making direct statements. His ideas are more or less as follows: [43] 1. Britain would probably actually welcome a Japanese attack on Russia, as she would think that it would lighten the pressure on her south. Nevertheless Britain and America would probably continue their aid to Russia (of which the quantity is very small). In case of a northern advance by the Japanese Army, he feels America's attitude would be more or less as you estimate in 1 of your wire. Part 2. 2. Two of your wire tallies with the German Attache's opinions. He even goes on to say that even though the Japanese Army should invade the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, America would probably not force even a political or commercial war with Japan, provided that the Japanese Army does not directly attack the Philippines or block the shipment of tin, rubber and the like from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. Part 3. He continues, if Japan should reserve these products like tin and rubber for her own exclusive use, America might declare war against us with little delay, but it is more probable that even in this case America would hesitate for a long time, giving Japan an interval which we would have to use for the assiduous collection of materials of war such as, for one, gasoline. 3. 3 and 4 of your wire coincide with the opinions of the German Attache. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Part 4. B. My opinions on the foregoing: 1. America is maintaining her traditional far-eastern policy, devoting her best efforts to upholding and augmenting her power in the Far East, particularly in the South Seas, and to insuring the transport of war materials to England from the South Seas, Australia, and India. Therefore, if the Empire should drive southwards I doubt that America would look on unconcerned. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.INFO Part 5. I mean, as I have set forth in previous wires, #159[a] and others, that although America would not force Japan into a decisive war, she would, quite possibly, sever economic relations, or start a commercial war, or take some action along that line. 2. The greater part of your wire #949[a] coincides with the views which the German Attache has frequently expressed to us. The German Councellor and Naval Attache also agree that an invasion of the Dutch East Indies by the Imperial Forces would probably not occasion a Japanese-American war. Part 6. However German and Italian, especially German, estimates on the U.S. are almost always over-optimistic and, at times are of such a nature as to make one think them deliberately planned for the purpose of impelling the Imperial Forces into a Northern or Southern Drive. [a] Not available. Trans. 5-2-45</p> 5428780 2009-01-23 04:15:02 2009-01-23 04:15:02 open open rikugunjikan-0-rik-5554-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5428780 publish 0 0 post 0 pearl Turkey 2.tur.001002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire http://Louis9J9Sheehan9esquire.blog.ca/2009/01/12/turkey-2-tur-001002-louis-j-sheehan-esquire-5362555/ Mon, 12 Jan 2009 04:20:23 +0100 Beforethebigbang <p>Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire . In regard to Japan's plans to move southward, Mr. Paulucci explained that he felt Hitler had placed too much stock in the invasion of the British Isles, since England would lose her main fighting power only if she were to be defeated in the Near East, the Mediterranean area and in Egypt. He suggested, therefore, that it was of the utmost importance to have the German government realize at this time the importance of: (1) The manipulation of Turkey; (2) The military moves in the Near East, Mediterranean and Egypt; (3) Access to the Near Eastern oil. With the accomplishment of these aims and the subsequent joining of the Axis powers by land and sea, not even the United States could compete with the power available to the Tripartite Powers.[1233] 508. Ambassador Horikiri Objects to Ending Japanese Trade with Italy On October 15, 1941 Ambassador Horikiri referred to the recent closing, with the exception of Mitsubishi, of all Japanese houses in Rome as compared with a mere reduction of Japanese personnel in Berlin. The Ambassador stressed the necessity of keeping the various businesses open at this time in order not to slight the Italians.[1234] Ambassador Horikiri also encouraged Japan to renew the Italian-East African compensatory trade agreement for a year.[1235] An agreement, which would be effective from June 30, 1941 to June 30, 1942, was achieved on October 17, 1941.[1236] [1233] Ibid. [1234] III, 955. [1235] III, 956. [1236] III, 957. [254] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (j) Japanese-French Relations 509. Japan Requests Increase in Japan-Thailand Plane Service Japan had demanded French cooperation in increasing regular plane service from Japan to Thailand, but the French had delayed in replying. According to a Japanese report of August 7, 1941, the French Attache for Air in Tokyo could make the following counter-proposal: (1) a. Semi-weekly service between Tokyo, Hanoi, and Bangkok. b. Semi-weekly service between Formosa, Canton, Hanoi and Bangkok. Total of four north-bound lines. (Abandon the line which detoured to Saigon). c. Bi-weekly seaplane arrivals in Saigon. (2) a. The French also be permitted to operate the same number of planes over the same course. b. In order that contact with the French Concession in Shanghai may be established, the French planes be permitted to stop at Shanghai. c. Materials be made available in Japan. The French agreed to approve paragraph (1), which was a rewording of Japanese demands, on the condition that the Japanese approve paragraph (2) of the French counter-proposal. However, in retransmitting these terms to Vichy and Hanoi, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda pointed out that paragraph (1) conflicted with the original request made by Japan, and though Japan could not approve points (a) and (b) of paragraph (2), it was willing to make suitable arrangements in regard to point (c). Foreign Minister Toyoda was anxious that negotiations be conducted along the lines of the original Japanese proposals, and he felt that Hanoi would be the best place in which to conduct them. Since two seaplane trips had already been made to transport a committee for the purpose of establishing definite boundaries, and since several more of these trips would be made, it was necessary that Japan establish a regular seaplane service as soon as possible. Further details in regard to the committee's investigating the boundary were not given at this time.[1237] 510. France Asks Permission to Exchange Soldiers Between Shanghai and French Indo-China Tokyo announced on August 7, 1941 that, in consideration of France's request to move 350 French soldiers from the Shanghai French Concession to French Indo-China, Foreign Minister Toyoda had granted tacit consent. Although it was difficult to grant such permission to France alone, the Foreign Minister felt that Japan could allow the requested exchange of soldiers in view of the special relationship existing between France and Japan.[1238] France had also asked that the French language be used for telegraphic communication between Japan and French Indo-China, in addition to Japanese, English, and German. Japan's "special consideration" to France in granting both of these requests was to be stressed when the recognition of the Nanking regime was discussed with Vice Premier Jean Francois Darlan, the Japanese Ambassador to Vichy was advised.[1239] [1237] III, 958. [1238] III, 959. [1239] III, 960. [255] 511. Japan Insists That France Recognize the Wang Regime Japan had insisted that France recognize Wang Ching-wei's government on the occasion of the signing of the Franco-Japanese agreement on July 29, 1941, but Vice Premier Darlan had promised only to give due consideration to the matter. Questioned by Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato on August 2, 1941, French Council President Bunoir Messien had replied that this question should not be discussed until public excitement, aroused as a result of the French Indo-Chinese question, had quieted down. http://34819louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com On August 5, 1941, calling on Vice Premier Darlan, whom he found to be away, Ambassador Kato had instead interviewed Acting Vice Minister Ernest Lagarde. The Japanese Ambassador was again advised that although Vice Premier Darlan was not opposed to the recognition, he felt that the matter should be shelved for two or three months. But Ambassador Kato replied that although the recognition "affects but one part of the Far East, the realization of this matter is of the utmost importance" and requested that France reach a speedy decision.[1240] http://34819louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com 512. Japan Demands Further French "Cooperation" On August 8, 1941 a Japanese representative in Shanghai, presumably Consul General Tateki Horiuchi, pointed out that the lack of a definite policy in regard to French rights and interests in the various parts of China was confusing to Japanese officials. Since Japan had succeeded in getting the French to agree to the joint defense of French Indo-China, he thought it best to make France adopt a policy of cooperation in respect to settling the China incident. The three principal points of his proposed cooperative agreement were: (1) that the French recognize the People's Government, thereby making the position of the French officials in China clear and their exercise of power easier, (2) that France agree to Japan's right to supervise the methods of guarding French concessions, controlling materials, using French currency, and to accept the People's Government's right to make proposals concerning them, and (3) that the French withdraw their garrisons or use them jointly with Japanese garrisons for defense. He remarked that in adjusting French relations with regard to the China incident, it would be unrealistic for Japan to use gentle methods since it had just exercised strong pressure in settling the French Indo-China question.[1241] 513. Japan Attempts to Limit Its Exchange Agreement with France After Tokyo had granted special consideration in the interchange of French troops, Consul Horiuchi in Shanghai was disturbed to learn that the French request included relief of French forces in Tientsin and Hankow as well as in Shanghai.[1242] Pointing out that the original French request and the Japanese reply had referred only to the relief of the Shanghai detachment, he asked that the inconsistency between the requests made by the French in Shanghai and by the French in Tokyo be investigated.[1243] 514. Japan Plans to Send Investigating Committee to French Indo-China Mr. Ken Harada, of the Japanese diplomatic staff in Vichy, conferred with General Arnald on August 8, 1941, to request the cooperation of French Indo-Chinese authorities with a Japanese committee of investigation which was being sent into their area. Expressing surprise at the number of people which Japan planned to include in this group, Mr. Arnald declared that he would answer the Japanese request for permission as soon as he had conferred with Colonial Minister Rear Admiral Charles Platon.[1244] On August 12, after Mr. Arnald had announced that [1240] III, 961. [1241] III, 962. [1242] III, 963. [1243] Ibid. [1244] III, 964. [256] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR the French had consented to the proposal submitted by Japan, and had agreed to send instructions to the Governor General in French Indo-China,[1245] Mr. Ken Harada said there was no need for the various stipulations previously requested by the French. 515. Marshal Petain Broadcasts to the French People After successive French Cabinet conferences, Marshal Philippe Petain spoke at 9:00 p.m. on August 12, 1941 to the whole of France. In his address he warned the French people of their desperate economic and political situation and pleaded for understanding from the United States. Marshal Petain also announced the appointment of Vice Premier Jean Francois Darlan to the post of Minister of National Defense. He aroused a sensation by his statement that the most damage to the work of reconstructing France had been caused by the supporters of the regime of yesteryear and the supporters of the trusts who stood between him and his people, and that in order to break their power, first of all, he must strike their leaders.[1246] 516. Ambassador Kato's Opinions on Conditions in France The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy intermittently informed his government of the internal conditions and opinions of the people in France. On August 14, 1941 he reported that the situation had grown more and more strained, with a shortage of materials, particularly of food, resulting in economic desperation and an increase in anti-German and anti-Vichy antipathy. Not only were the activities of the Free French and the Communist Party troublesome throughout both the occupied and unoccupied areas, but also the propaganda activities of England, the United States and the DeGaullists had played havoc with the "esprit francais" to such an extent that the Vichy government was beginning to feel that maintaining peace and order might be beyond its power.[1247] 517. Japan Demands Rubber Supply Allotment to the United States A Japanese demand that 5,000 tons of Indo-Chinese rubber, which had been promised to the United States, be diverted by France to Japan, caused Mr. Harada, the Counsellor at the Vichy Embassy on August 12, 1941, to confer with Mr. Arnald of the Vichy Foreign Office. The French official declared that an agreement with the United States for the rubber had already been signed, and inasmuch as it was necessary that French Indo-China maintain its trade status with America, it would be very difficult to divert the supply to Japan. It was divulged at this time that plans were being made to transport rubber to France by way of South America, and although at least a part of the rubber would have to be diverted to Germany, Mr. Arnald begged that Japan, in her demands on French Indo-China, consider the present poverty of France.[1248] Possibly as a means of delaying its unavoidable compliance with Japanese demands, France asked that the negotiations be conducted in Tokyo, and protested that before diverting the rubber to Japan, the approval of the American authorities would have to be secured. France also asked that Japan advise the United States of the action which was to be taken.[1249] Difficulty was foreseen in Japan's paying for the rubber, since France, already holding many transferable yen, was reluctant to receive more of this currency in payment for commodities, and, furthermore, was anxious that Japan speed up its exports to French Indo-China.[1250] [1245] III, 965. [1246] III, 966. [1247] Ibid. [1248] III, 967. [1249] III, 968. [1250] III, 969. [257] Finally, French Official Arnald disclosed on August 30, 1941 that as a result of conversations with the United States, it would be possible to transfer the requested 5,000 tons of rubber to Japan. Of the remaining 7 tons of French Indo-China rubber, the French government had decided that 4 tons would be allotted to Germany and 3 tons to Japan. Japan, however, declared that 6 tons of her required rubber would still be lacking, and requested, therefore, that if it were found impossible to ship any part of the French or German allotments for 1941, these quantities also be transferred to Japan.[1251] 518. Japanese Occupation Expenses Create Difficulty in Currency Exchange To provide funds for the expenses of its occupation troops in French Indo-China, Japan arranged to make piasters[1252] available to its forces through an exchange of currency between the Bank of Indo-China and the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank. However, it was still necessary to work out the details of exchange, and during August, September and October 1941, dispatches pertaining to this matter continued to flow between Vichy and Tokyo, and Hanoi and Tokyo. On August 16, 1941 Ambassador Kato sent to Tokyo the terms of the exchange agreement which had been presented to him two days before by the French Foreign Office. The payment of occupation expenses was to be left to the Bank of Indo-China and the Bank of Japan, although it was suggested that when Japanese forces needed piasters, they should pay to the Bank of Indo-China the dollars of transferable yen requested by the French government, after which the Bank of Indo-China would pay out an equivalent in piasters.[1253] On August 18, 1941 the Japanese Finance Ministry declared that Tokyo had been momentarily expecting receipt of funds amounting to 4,500,000 Japanese dollars, which was the payment specified in the text of the joint-defense treaty, to cover military expenses of the Japanese Army of Occupation for August. Japanese military authorities insisted that payment of the August apportionment was to be made by the night of August 16, 1941, and formal representations were to be made to the Governor General of Indo-China for the continuance of conversations on payment terms of the Yokohama Specie Band representatives.[1254] Because France was not operating with money exported by Japan to French Indo-China, its holdings of transferable yen already amounted to considerable sums. For this reason France was hoping to be paid, to some extent, in gold for materials supplied to Japanese troops at Saigon. However, since France, by September 1, 1941, had consented to accept transferable yen, Ambassador Kato in Vichy asked whether Japan had already agreed to pay the full amount in gold on the spot.[1255] 519. Japan Vetoes a Proposed German Legation in Indo-China There appeared to be no reason to establish a proposed German delegation in Indo-China, Japan informed its Ambassador in Berlin on August 21, 1941. Japan felt that the German Armistice Commission in France was sufficient, although it had no basic reason to oppose the German move. Should the German government establish such a body despite Japanese opposition, Japan would have to adopt new measures regarding the present Franco-Japanese defense cooperation.[1256] In discussing Germany's motive for such action, Japan argued that the Germans had acknowleged that they had no political "claims" on French Indo-China, and that it was Japan's intention to give Germany full economic assistance in the matter of supplying necessary com- [1251] III, 970. [1252] The piastre, a Thaiese monetary unit, is equivalent to $0.083692 or roughly $.08 of the American dollar. [1253] III, 971. [1254] III, 972. [1255] III, 973. [1256] III, 974. [258] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR modities. Foreign Minister Toyoda claimed that since the establishment of a German agency in French Indo-China would needlessly complicate the "status" of French Indo-China, Japan could not favor the proposed plan. For these reasons, he asked that Germany reconsider its proposal.[1257] Japan also informed its representatives both in Hanoi and Berlin that in view of the relationship existing between Japan and Indo-China, the Japanese government should be notified in case French Indo-China entered into any new permanent political relationship with another country. In this matter, it would be proper for Germany to notify the Japanese government in advance.[1258] 520. Japan Demands French Concurrence in the Establishment of the Japan-Thailand Air Route After appealing to Germany for support in the establishment of plane service between Japan and Thailand as it had done before in the case of the Franco-Japanese joint-defense agreement negotiations, Japan learned from Ambassador Oshima that France, under clause twelve of the Armistice Agreement, needed Germany's permission before joining the air route, but did not require its approval of Japanese operational plans. Ambassador Oshima suggested that the question as to whether the French should join the air route be postponed, but that negotiations to have the Japanese demands recognized at once be continued.[1259] On September 2, 1941 Japan demanded that an end be made to the procrastination of French Indo-Chinese authorities, who claimed that the Governor General of French Indo-China had no authority to approve the air route, unless Japan first secured the understanding of the German authorities through the Vichy government. Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that the German authorities had offered no objection, as evidenced by Ambassador Oshima's report to the Foreign Minister on August 22, 1941,[1260] and as a result of this, Ambassador Kato informed French Official Arnald, that France and Japan would settle the problem by themselves. 521. Ambassador Kato Reports on the Attempted Assassination of Mr. Pierre Laval and Mr. Marcel Deat Following the shooting at Versailles on August 27, 1941 of Mr. Pierre Laval, former French Premier, and Mr. Marcel Deat, editor of the Paris newspaper L'Oeuvre, both ardent advocates of Franco-Nazi collaboration, Ambassador Kato on September 1, 1941 made a report to his home government on the anti-German tendencies in France. In connection with the shooting, the French government had disclosed the fact that the Communist Party had been spreading anti-German sentiment and had issued orders to aid the DeGaulle movement. Other instances of anti-German sentiment, Mr. Kato explained, were railway sabotages and the assassination of German soldiers.[1261] 522. Japan Increases Demands for Indo-China Rubber Apparently not having received the wire from Ambassador Kato on the previous day to the effect that the rubber supply (5,000 tons) formerly marked for the United States could be diverted to Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared on September 1, 1941 that he did not believe that any agreement concerning rubber for America had been signed, and there was no reason to obtain America's consent in the matter. Therefore, he instructed Ambassador Kato to arrange for the purchase with free yen of the 5,000 tons of rubber without any conditions [1267] III, 975. [1258] Ibid. [1258] III, 976. [1269] III, 976. [1260] III, 977-978. [1261] III, 979. [259] attached.[1262] Ambassador Kato reported that since there had been no objection from the German committee in Paris, the French had gone ahead with the export of the 5,000 tons of rubber to America.[1263] Meanwhile the question of the French Indo-Chinese rubber supply was being discussed in Berlin. On September 5, 1941, in a conference with Ambassador Oshima, Vice Minister Ernst Von Weizsacker expressed Germany's feeling that the transportation of rubber to Germany from Japan had not been given sufficient consideration, since of the 25,000 tons of French Indo-China rubber marked for America for 1941, 15,000 tons had been consigned to Japan, and negotiations were then in progress for the allotment of the remaining 10,000 tons to Japan. These figures appeared to pertain to the total annual output of rubber rather than the immediate supply on hand in the French colonies.[1264] Since 9,000 of the 15,000 tons earmarked for France had already been shipped, Germany decided that 4,000 tons of the remaining French shipment should be transferred to Japan.[1265] By September 10, 1941 the shipment of 5,000 tons of rubber to America had been stopped, for the conversations between the United States and France regarding the French allotment were discontinued. Japanese officials in Berlin were informed of the representations which had been made to the Vichy Commercial Attache. These were: (a) France is to prohibit the export to the United States in view of the close Japanese-German cooperation. (b) The supplementary amount to be given Japan is 10,000 tons. (c) The German "schedule" is approved.[1266] 523. Japan Decrees Expulsion of Hostile Chinese in French Indo-China A warning was transmitted to Japanese representatives in Vichy and in Hanoi on September 2, 1941 that the personnel of the Chungking regime in French Indo-China would have to be expelled or imprisoned. Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that the activity of the Chungking regime might cause some unforeseen incident since the Japanese Army of Occupation was instructed to blockade Chungking. If the French Indo-Chinese authorities took no steps in eradicating these elements or procrastinated too long, Japan might be forced to take the initiative.[1267] The Foreign Minister declared that this matter was so important that instructions concerning it would be sent to the Japanese Army of Occupation in French Indo-China.[1268] On September 11, 1941 the Japanese Consul at Saigon, visiting the Chief of the Bureau for the preservation of Public Peace, inquired concerning the status of Chinese consular offices. The Saigon official answered that it was not clear whether the consular offices would be closed, but that the staff members of the Ministry had been withdrawn to a city near the southeastern coast of French Indo-China with only a caretaker left in Saigon.[1269] In Vichy, the removal of pro-Chungking Chinese was still being discussed. On September 16, 1941, when Mr. Harada had cited a newspaper report that the representatives of the Chungking regime were withdrawing from Saigon, Vice Minister Roshier, a French official, informed him that the French government had heard nothing to support these reports. Mr. Harada then pointed out the inconsistency of having Chungking representatives remain in the areas in which Japanese forces were stationed, and again requested that the matter be settled quickly.[1270] [1262] III, 980. [1263] III, 981. [1261] III, 982. [1266] III, 983-984. [1266] III, 985. [1267] III, 986. [1268] III, 987. [1269] III, 988. [1270] III, 989. [260] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR 524. French Vice Premier Doubts German Propaganda On September 6, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador at Vichy, reporting on a conversation with Vice Premier Darlan which had been held on the previous day, said that the French Vice Premier, now also the Minister of Defense, had stated that, although Russia had had more arms and war material than Germany had estimated, three-fourths of this quantity had been lost. Since it was understood that after gaining a foothold in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov by mid-October 1941, Germany would temporarily cease activity, the Vice Premier declared that he would like to see France and Germany reach some sort of settlement by that time. The French official also expressed doubt as to the authenticity of Germany's reports of the number of war losses, since the announced figure of 100,000 dead and wounded appeared to be too small.[1271] 525. France Resists Japan's Insistent Requests for Recognition of Nanking Japan secretly informed its representatives in China that when France had recognized the Wang regime, discussions would be undertaken to reconsider the request of the French that Japan grant permission for the relief of the Tientsin detachment.[1272] In spite of continued pressure, Vice Premier Darlan reiterated on September 8, 1941 that although France had no objection to recognizing the Nanking regime, in view of previous French-Chungking relations, the state wished to "take more time about it".[1273] 527. Japanese Official Suggests That Domei News Agency Be Admonished Mr. S. Baron Araki, a Japanese official in French Indo-China, who was extremely concerned about reports in Japanese newspapers that many DeGaullists, pro-British, and Americans were leaving French Indo-China, asked on September 10, 1941 that the Domei home office be admonished to exercise great care before publishing similar reports, which were nothing but the false propaganda of the British and would lead to an unpleasant situation.[1275] 528. Japanese Diplomatic Staff in Vichy Experiences Privations of War The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, finding it impossible to obtain fish and meat in France, informed Tokyo on September 11, 1941, that the members of his diplomatic staff were forced to be vegetarians, and had lost a lot of weight. He requested 100 cases of food of 60 cans each, as well as other items enumerated in a previous dispatch to Tokyo on July 10, 1941.[1276] 529. Germany Agrees to Shipment of French Rubber to Japan Acting on instructions from the German government, the German Commerical Attache informed officials in Tokyo on September 16, 1941 that Germany had agreed to send an additional amount of 10,000 tons of rubber to Japan, and also that Germany had agreed to divide equally between Japan and Germany the production increase exceeding 68,000 tons.[1277] Transmitted to Vichy and Saigon for reference was the information that France had permitted the French Indo-China governor to ship 5,000 tons of rubber as the September allotment to Japan. This led the German Commercial Attache in Tokyo, who reported this fact, to believe that the French colonies were prepared to fulfill Japan's demands after this date, just as before.[1278] [1271] III, 990. [1272] III, 991. [1273] III, 992. [1275] III, 994. [1276] III, 995. [1277] III, 996. [1278] III, 997. [261] Information that the Yokohama Specie bank and the French Indo-China bank had effected a settlement of 500,000 Swiss francs which was to be transferred at the end of October, and 3,450,000 piasters and 1,240,000 free yen, was dispatched to Vichy on September 24, 1941.[1279] 530. Occupation Expenses Negotiations are Transferred to Diplomatic Channels During the last part of August and the first part of September, conferences were being conducted between the Yokohama Specie bank and the Indo-China bank to complete details of the agreement to exchange piasters for American dollars, gold or free yen. By September 16, 1941, when no settlement had been reached, a communique from the Japanese Minister of Finance to Economic Attache Yumato in Berlin disclosed that negotiations were to be transferred to the Japanese and French governments, thus transferring settlement to the diplomatic field. The Attache was directed to cooperate in expediting the negotiations which Ambassador Kato was conducting in Vichy, and was warned to make preparations for future negotiations since Japan desired that its wishes in the matter be carried out.[1280] 531. Japan Insists that France Pay Supplementary Occupation Expenses The Minister of Finance revealed on September 16 and 20, 1941 that Japan would soon insist that the French pay a supplementary amount for the expense of the troops stationed in French Indo-China, as had been decided upon in the joint-defense agreement. France was to pay 66,000,000 piasters[1281] for supplementary expenditure for barracks, stables, depots, aviation fields, airplane hangars, supply depots, housing for various military equipment and marine transportation incurred by the Japanese Army of Occupation in French Indo-China. In explaining the itemized demand, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the former agreement whereby France would pay 23,000,000 piasters related principally to expenses incurred in occupying the territory and did not include these new items. Furthermore, the French government was to turn over all existing barracks, warehouses, and remount depots, was to do nothing to block Japanese demands, and was to assist Japan's military establishments in every way.[1282] If France were reluctant to supply the supplementary occupation expenses, it would be necessary to adopt forceful negotiations.[1283] Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Kato to enter into negotiations for the supplementary payments of 66,000,000 piasters which would be made in Japanese free gold yen or in foreign gold.[1284] The September and October portions of 11,500,000 piasters each were to be paid at the earliest opportunity, and action was to be taken to ensure the receiving of 21,500,000 piasters at the end of the months of November and December.[1285] Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that the question of linking the piasters to Japanese currency might be introduced, but advised his representatives not to mention the whole amount which Japan was demanding to avoid difficulties in collecting the installments for September and October. For the further information of Ambassador Kato who was to make these demands, Foreign Minister Toyoda sent to Vichy, on September 20, 1941, the information that the Japanese occupation forces were poorly quartered, and had not been permitted to use the warehouses of the French army. Ambassador Kato was also informed that the French authorities had requested that the Indo-Chinese forces be responsible for the border regions facing China and [1279] III, 998. [1280] III, 999-1000. [1281] The equivalent of approximately $5,280,000 in American money. [1282] III, 1001-1002. [1282] III, 991. [1284] The total in the Japanese dispatch reads 66,000,000 but additions to the items listed amounts to 76,000,000. [1285] III, 1003. [262] THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR Thailand, and that the Japanese forces be responsible for the remaining areas. From this it appeared that Indo-China was anxious not to provoke the Chinese army.[1286] 532. Ambassador Kato Reports that Germany Favors Franco-German Collaboration In view of the fact that France desired a revision of the terms of the Franco-German Armistice, the Japanese Ambassador, for the information of his government, continued to submit reports in regard to internal conditions in France. Since Germany was confident of the outcome of the German-Soviet war, and felt no anxiety regarding the coming war with England, a member of the German Embassy in Paris said that Franco-German cooperation was to be desired, and Ambassador Kato reported that preliminary attempts had been made to achieve cooperation. Furthermore, he informed Tokyo, on September 23, 1941, that the maintaining of peace in the occupied area was hardly a problem.[1287] 533. France Delays Payment of Occupation Expenses The Japanese Ambassador at Vichy informed Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that Mr. Arnald had reported that Saigon had made inquiry of the Tokyo Specie Bank as to the disposition of the August payment of free yen, and that until a decision had been made, France was not prepared to accept the Japanese proposal of its paying one-third (possibly this means one-third in gold and the rest in free yen) for the month of September.[1288] On September 24, 1941 Ambassador Kato presented to the French Foreign Minister the Japanese demand for the payment of 66,000,000 piasters[1289] for the support of the Japanese army in French Indo-China. Vice Premier Darlan stated that his understanding was that the French government was to lend the money temporarily, and Ambassador Kato answered that Japan intended to repay the sum advanced by means of gold, free yen, or foreign currency. The Japanese Ambassador explained that the September and October payments required immediate action, whereupon Vice Premier Darlan immediately called the offices concerned.[1290] A week later Tokyo urged its Ambassador at Vichy to impress upon the French the urgency for negotiating this matter, and disclosed that a concrete proposal for method of payment would be made in a subsequent message.[1291] Ambassador Kato had already informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that the main difficulty with the French concerning the occupation expenses seemed to arise from the manner in which the present economic treaty was being carried out.[1292] 534. Vice Premier Darlan Denies Seeking American Intervention Vice Premier Darlan and Ambassador Kato discussed several items during their conversation on September 24, 1941. Because the French Vice Premier had received some very unsatisfactory reports from French Indo-China, he was anxious that Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa[1293] take up his post at the earliest possible moment. Therefore, Ambassador Kato asked on September 24, 1941 that he be informed when the Ambassador would start for his office.[1294] [1286] III, 1004-1005. [1287] III, 1006. [1288] III, 1007. [1289] See footnote 1284. [1290] III, 1008. [1291] III, 998, 1009. [1292] III, 1010. [1293] Possibly Kenkichi Yoshizawa, former Ambassador to France, serving in July, 1941 as member of House of Peers. [1294] III, 1011. [263] Concerning the reaction of the United States to the joint-defense agreement, Vice Premier Darlan said that he had replied to Ambassador William D. Leahy who had informed him of the United States' displeasure with the pact in question, that France was taking this action after considering the respective positions of Japan and France, and he would like the United States "to stay out of this affair". He had added that since France could gain nothing by resisting Germany in Europe and since there would be no point in wrangling with Japan in the Far East, he could not understand Japanese suspicion that France had sought American intervention in the matter, especially since the United States could not help.[1295] 535. Japan Seizes a Railroad and Demands Military Installations in French Indo-China After unsuccessfully requesting that Indo-Chinese officials demand was accompanied by the warning that unless France complied by September 26, 1941 these establishments would be occupied by force. Asked by the French Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese army be instructed to avoid the use of force, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied that he could not issue such instructions, unless French acceptance of Japanese demands was guaranteed. To avoid creating unnecessary trouble, he suggested that the French Ambassador strongly recommend to the Governor General the acceptance of the demands of the Japanese army